Abstract. Not only the free web is victim to China's excessive censorship, but also the Tor anonymity network: the Great Firewall of China prevents thousands of potential Tor users from accessing the network. In this paper, we investigate how the blocking mechanism is implemented, we conjecture how China's Tor blocking infrastructure is designed and we propose countermeasures. Our work bolsters the understanding of China's censorship capabilities and thus paves the way towards more effective evasion techniques.
Introduction
On October 4, 2011 a user reported to the Tor bug tracker that unpublished bridges stop working after only a few minutes when used from within China [1] . Bridges are unpublished Tor relays and their very purpose is to help censored users to access the Tor network if the "main entrance" is blocked. The bug report indicated that the Great Firewall of China (GFC) has been enhanced with the potentiality of dynamically blocking Tor. This censorship attempt is by no means China's first effort to block Tor. In the past, there have been efforts to block the website [2], the public Tor network [3, 4] and parts of bridges [5] . According to reports, these blocks were realised by simple IP blacklisting and HTTP header filtering [2] . All these blocking attempts had in common that they were straightforward and inflexible.
In contrast to the above mentioned censorship attempts, the currently observable block appears to be much more flexible and sophisticated. Freshly set up bridges get blocked within only minutes. In addition, the GFC blocks bridges dynamically without simply enumerating their IP addresses and blacklisting them (cf. [6] ).
In this paper, we try to deepen the understanding of the infrastructure used by the GFC to block the Tor anonymity network. Our contributions are threefold:
1. We reveal how Chinese users are hindered from accessing the Tor network. 2. We conjecture how China's Tor blocking infrastructure is designed. 3. We discuss evasion strategies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of previous work. Section 3 introduces our experimental setup. Section 4 presents how users are prevented from using Tor and Section 5 analyses
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China's underlying infrastructure. Evasion strategies are discussed in Section 6. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 7.
Related Work
Our work is not the first documentation of the current Chinese attempts to block the Tor anonymity network. In [7] , Wilde revealed first crucial insights about the block. Over a period of one week in December 2011, Wilde analysed how unpublished Tor bridges are getting scanned and, as a result, blocked by the GFC. Wilde's experiments relied upon a virtual private server (VPS) inside China and several Tor EC2 cloud bridges [8, 9] located in the USA.
According to Wilde's results, the basic functionality of the Chinese Tor blocking infrastructure is depicted in Figure 1 . When a Tor user in China establishes a connection to a bridge or relay, deep packet inspection (DPI) boxes recognise the Tor protocol (1) . Shortly after a Tor connection is detected, active scanning is initiated (2). The scanning is done by seemingly random Chinese IP addresses. The scanners connect to the respective bridge and try to establish a Tor connection (3) . If it succeeds, the bridge is blocked. Wilde was able to narrow down the suspected cause for active scanning to the cipher list sent by the Tor client inside the TLS client hello 1 . This cipher list appears to be unique and only used by Tor. That gives the GFC the opportunity to easily identify Tor connections. Furthermore, Wilde noticed that active scanning is done at multiples of 15 minutes. The GFC launches several scanners to connect to the bridge at the next full 15 minute multiple when a Tor cipher list was detected. An analysis of the Tor debug logs yielded that Chinese scanners initiate a TLS connection, conduct a renegotiation and start building a Tor circuit, once the TLS connection was set up. After the scan succeeded, the IP address together with the associated port (we now refer to this as "IP:port tuple") of the freshly scanned bridge is blocked resulting in Chinese users not being able to use the bridge anymore.
In addition to the above mentioned key findings, Wilde provided additional data to strengthen his results such as traceroutes to suspected scanners, a sample of IP addresses believed to be scanners as well as an analysis of what is known as garbage scanning: Chinese scanners sending seemingly random binary data to TLS-speaking hosts. The garbage scanning does not seem to be related to Tor although it seems to make use of the same infrastructure.
With respect to Wilde's contribution, we (a) revisit many experiments in greater detail and with significantly more data, we (b) rectify observations which we did not find to be true anymore and we (c) answer yet open questions.
Experimental Setup
We begin this section by discussing the legal and ethical aspects of our work. We then discuss the vantage points we used in our analysis and point out the shortcomings.
Legal and Ethical Aspects
During the process of preparing and running our experiments we took special care to not violate any laws. In addition, all our experiments were in accordance with the terms of service of our service providers. In order to ensure reproducibility and encourage further research, we publish our gathered data and developed code 2 . The data includes IP addresses of Chinese hosts which were found to conduct active scanning of our Tor bridge. We carefully configured our Tor bridges to remain unpublished and we always picked randomly chosen high ports to listen to so we can say that the data is free from legitimate Tor users.
Vantage Points
In order to ensure a high degree of confidence in our results, we used different vantage points. We had a relay in Russia, bridges in Singapore and Sweden and clients in China.
Bridge in Singapore: A large part of our experiments was conducted with our Tor bridge located in Singapore. The bridge was running inside the Amazon EC2 cloud [8] . The OpenNet Initiative reports Singapore as a country conducting minimal Internet filtering involving only pornography [11] . Hence, we assume that our experimental results were not falsified by Internet filtering in Singapore.
Bridge in Sweden: To reproduce certain experiments, we set up Tor bridges located at our institution in Sweden. Internet filtering at Karlstad University is limited to well-known malware ports which we avoided during the experiments. Thus, we can rule out filtering mechanisms interfering with our results.
Clients in China: To avoid biased results, we used two types of vantage points inside China: open SOCKS proxies and a VPS.
We compiled a list of public Chinese SOCKS proxies by searching Google. We were able to find a total of 32 SOCKS proxies which were distributed amongst 12 distinct autonomous systems. We used the SOCKS proxies to rerun certain experiments on a smaller scale to rule out phenomena limited to our VPS.
Our second vantage point and primary experimental machine is a rented VPS. The VPS ran Linux and resided in the autonomous system number (ASN) 4808. We had full root access to the VPS which made it possible for us to sniff traffic and conduct experiments below the application layer such as packet fragmentation and manipulation. Most of our experiments were conducted from our VPS whereas the SOCKS proxies' primary use was to verify results.
Relay in Russia: A public Tor relay located in a Russian data center was used to investigate the blocking public Tor relays are undergoing. The relay served as middle relay, meaning that it does not have direct contact with Tor users and it does not see their exit traffic.
Shortcomings
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is not limited to physics [12] but also applies to active network measurement to some extent. Injecting packets into a network for the sake of measuring a phenomena inevitably interferes with the observed results. This is particularly critical when measuring censorship systems.
Active analysis of a censorship system can easily attract the censor's attention if no special care is taken to "stay under the radar". Due to the fact that China is a sophisticated censor with the potential power to actively falsify measurement results, we have to point out potential shortcomings in our experimental setup.
First of all, we have no reliable information about the owners of our public SOCKS proxies. Whois-lookups did not yield anything suspicious but the information in the records can be spoofed. Second, our VPS was located in a data center where Tor connections typically do not originate. We also had no information about whether our service provider conducts Internet filtering and the type or extent thereof.
We are aware of the above mentioned shortcomings and designed our experiments in a way to minimise falsifying effects. We reproduced our experiments from different vantage points to eliminate phenomena limited to one point of view.
Why Alice Cannot Use Tor in China
This section shows how the Tor anonymity network is blocked in China. We focus on the blocking mechanisms. A detailed analysis of how the blocking is designed is provided in Section 5. We present our findings by accompanying Alice who lives in China and wants to use the Tor network. We point out all the difficulties she faces during her journey towards a free Internet ranging from accessing the Tor website [13] to the use of bridges.
Website Block
First, the Tor application is required to use the anonymity network. One way to get the binary is to download it from the website [13] . This is where the censorship begins because the website is partially inaccessible in China. We discovered that the GFC monitors the "Host" field in the HTTP header 3 . If the field equals "torproject.org", the connection is reset by injected RST segments as described in [14] . Slight variations of the field's content, such as "orproject.org" and "torproject.or" do not lead to injected RST segments.
We tracked down the cause of the injected RST segments to the "Host" field by sending the same HTTP request to different IP addresses. Our connection was also reset after connecting to "innocent" domains such as gmail.com, kau.se and baidu.com. In addition, we were able to connect to one of the Tor Project's web servers and send a GET request for gmail.com. We received an error message from the web server without any interference from the GFC. Furthermore, we received the correct DNS reply for "torproject.org" from our Chinese DNS servers. We conclude that the string "torproject.org" in the "Host" HTTP field causes injected RST segments and that the IP addresses of the Tor Project's web servers are not blacklisted.
We found mirrors whose hostname do not contain "torproject.org" to be reachable too. And since the official Tor website offers HTTPS, all Alice has to do is to add an "s" after "http" in her browser in order to make the official web site load.
The Public Tor Network
Now that Alice could download the Tor Browser Bundle, she immediately starts it. Without further configuration, her client first tries to connect to the directory authorities and fetch the consensus which contains the list of all public Tor relays.
However, all but one of the nine directory authorities are blocked on the IP layer. From within China they neither respond to pings, nor are any TCP services available. From our unfiltered connection in Sweden we were able to contact the directory authorities over ICMP and TCP. We have no explanation, however, why the directory authority with the IP address 212.112.245.170 is not blocked.
If Alice is lucky, her client might connect to the unblocked directory authority and is then able to download the consensus. But even then Alice has to face disappointment again. As we will describe in Section 5 in detail, almost all of the public relays are blocked from inside China.
From our middle relay in Russia we were able to verify that the blocking is realised by dropping the SYN/ACK segment sent by the relay to the client. The SYN segment sent by Alice's client to the relay passes the GFC unhindered.
Bridges
So far Alice could download the Tor client application but she was unable to use the public network. The Tor Project came up with the concept of bridges [15] since it is not hard for a censor to block access to the public network. Bridges are essentially relays which are not listed in the public consensus. Their robustness relies on the assumption that it is hard for censors to find out all their IP addresses and block them.
Alice does not give up and tries her luck with bridges. She obtains some bridge descriptors 4 from the bridge distribution website [16] . Unfortunately, none of the received bridges were reachable. As it turns out, they are blocked in the same way as public relays: Alice's client can send SYN segments to them and they reply with a SYN/ACK segment, but the reply segment never reaches its intended destination.
Analysis
The previous section revealed that the Tor network is blocked on at least three layers consisting of the website, the directory authorities and the relays (including bridges). In this section we take a closer look at the blocking infrastructure. In particular, we look at the origin of the active scans.
How Long Do Bridges Remain Blocked?
So far it is unclear for how long a freshly blocked bridge remains blocked. To answer this question, we invoked two Tor processes on our bridge in Singapore. Before this experiment we changed the IP address of the machine in Singapore in order to avoid interference with previous experiments. Both Tor processes were private bridges and listening on TCP port 27418 and 23941. Both ports were chosen randomly.
In the next step, we made the GFC block both IP:port tuples by initiating Tor connections to them from our VPS in China. After the GFC started to block both tuples, we set up iptables [17] rules to whitelist our VPS in China to port 23941 and drop all other connections. That way, the tuple should appear unreachable to the world with the exception of our Chinese VPS. Port 27418 remained unchanged and hence reachable. We then started monitoring the reachability of both Tor processes by continuously trying to connect to the processes using telnet from our VPS.
After approximately 12 hours, the Tor process behind port 23941 (which appeared to be unreachable to the GFC) became reachable again whereas connections to port 27418 still timed out and continued to do so. In our iptables logs we could find numerous connection attempts stemming from Chinese scanners. This observation shows that once a Tor bridge has been blocked, it only remains blocked if Chinese scanners are able to continuously connect to the bridge. If they cannot, the block is removed.
Is the Public Network Reachable?
In a previous section we shortly mentioned that most of the public relays are blocked. To verify this, we downloaded the published consensus from February 23 at 09:00. At the time, the consensus contained descriptors for a total of 2819 relays. Then, from our Chinese VPS we tried to establish a TCP connection to the Tor port of every single relay. If we were able to successfully establish a TCP connection we classified the relay as reachable, otherwise unreachable.
We found that our Chinese client could successfully establish TCP connections with 47 out of all 2819 (1.6%) public relays. We manually inspected the descriptors of the 47 relays, but could not find any common property which could have been responsible for the relays being unblocked in China. We checked the availability of the reachable relays again after a period of three days. Only one out of the 47 unfiltered relays was still reachable.
Where Does the Filtering Happen?
We want to gain a better understanding of where the Chinese DPI boxes are looking for the Tor fingerprint. In detail, we try to investigate whether the DPI boxes also analyse domestic and ingress traffic.
We used six open Chinese SOCKS proxies distributed across four autonomous systems (ASN 4134, 4837, 9808 and 17968) to investigate domestic filtering. We simulated the initiation of a Tor connection multiple times to randomly chosen TCP ports on our VPS, but could not attract any active scans.
Previous research confirmed that Chinese HTTP keyword filtering is bidirectional [14] , i.e., keywords are scanned in both directions. We wanted to find out whether this is true for the Tor DPI infrastructure too. To verify that, we tried to initiate Tor connections to our Chinese VPS from our vantage points in Sweden, Russia and Singapore. Despite multiple attempts we were not able to attract a single scan.
The above mentioned results indicate that Tor filtering is probably only done at Chinese border ASes and only with traffic going from inside China to the outside world. We believe that there are two reasons for this. First, filtering domestic traffic in addition to international traffic would dramatically increase the amounts of data to analyse since domestic traffic is believed to be the largest fraction of Chinese traffic [18] . Second, at the time of this writing there are no relays in China so there is no need to filter domestic or ingress traffic. Tor usage in China means being able to connect to the outside world.
What Pattern Is Matched by the GFC?
Wilde discovered that the GFC identifies Tor connections by searching for the cipher list sent by Tor clients [7] . The cipher list is part of the TLS client hello which is sent by the Tor user to the relay or bridge after a TCP connection has been established. This particular cipher list, see Listing 1.1, appears to be unique to Tor. c0 0 a c0 14 00 39 00 38 c0 0 f c0 05 00 35 c0 07 c0 09 c0 11 c0 13 00 33 00 32 c0 0 c c0 0 e c0 02 c0 04 00 04 00 05 00 2 f c0 08 c0 12 00 16 00 13 c0 0 d c0 03 fe ff 00 0 a 00 ff Listing 1.1. Tor cipher list inside TLS client hello.
According to our experiments, the Chinese DPI boxes are still looking for this particular cipher list. However, we show that the mere occurence of the cipher list anywhere in the payload is not enough to trigger scanning. The context seems to be relevant.
In order to verify that the context is relevant, we embed the TLS handshake pattern inside an HTTP request. The TLS handshake was disguised as UserAgent as can be seen in Listing 1.2.
GET / HTTP /1.1 Host : baidu . com User -Agent : < HANDSHAKE > Listing 1.2. Crafted HTTP request.
We proceeded to send this pseudo HTTP request to our bridge in Singapore. Despite several attempts with slightly modified requests, we were not able to trigger scanning. We then set the first 6 bytes in the same HTTP requests to 0x00 and sent it again. This time, we were able to trigger scanning. We assume that the "GET" string at the beginning of the payload made the DPI boxes load a different set of patterns to match.
Where Are the Scanners Coming From?
An important question we have not answered yet is where the active scans originate. To get extensive data for answering this question, we continuously attracted active scanners over a period of 17 days ranging from March 6 to March 23. We attracted scanners by simulating Tor connections from within China to our bridge in Singapore 5 . For the simulation of Tor connections, we created a program whose only purpose was to send the Tor TLS client hello to the bridge and terminate afterwards. This is enough "bait" to attract active scanners. After every Tor connection simulation, our program remained inactive for a randomly chosen value between 9 and 14 minutes. The experiment yielded 3295 scans of our bridge. Our findings based on this data are described below.
Scanner IP Address Distribution We are interested in the scanner's IP address distribution, i.e., how often can we find a particular IP address in our logs? Our data exhibits two surprising characteristics: We could only find a company named "Guanda Technology Amusement Equipment Co., Ltd" on the Internet. It is not clear whether this is the same company. However, as explained below, we have reason to believe that the scanner's IP addresses are spoofed by the GFC so the owner of the IP address, assuming that it even exists, may not be aware of the scanning activity.
Whois Records
To learn more about the origin of the scanners we iterated over the entire corpus of gathered scanner IP addresses and fetched the associated whois records. We manually investigated the obtained records and discovered that all IP addresses are under the control of only two ISPs: China Telecom and China Unicom 6 . Both ISPs do not limit their scanner IPs to one single network, but instead make use of networks distributed over multiple Chinese provinces. Using our whois data we found out that the scanner IPs originated from 135 different networks of varying size.
Judging by the number of subscribers, China Telecom and Unicom are the two biggest ISPs not just in China, but also worldwide [19] . In addition, both are run by the state. These two prerequisites are possibly perfect breeding ground for censorship.
Autonomous System Origin We used the IP to ASN mapping service provided by Team Cymru [20] to get the autonomous system number for every observed scanner. The result reveals that all scanners come from one of three ASes 7 with the respective percentage of observed scanners in parantheses:
CNCGROUP-GZ China Unicom Guangzhou network (3.8%)
AS4134 is owned by China Telecom and AS4837 as well as AS17622 is owned by China Unicom. AS4134 and AS4837 are the two largest ASes in China [21] and play a crucial role in the country-wide censorship as pointed out by Xu, Mao and Halderman [22] . Furthermore, Roberts et al. [21] found out that China's AS level structure is far from uniform with a significant fraction of the countries traffic being routed through AS4134 or AS4837.
Reverse DNS Using Google's open DNS server 8.8.8.8 we conducted reverse DNS lookups for all collected IP addresses. This process yielded 284 DNS PTR records. With the exception of several misconfigured records which were resolved to hn.kd.dhcp, hn.kd.ny.adsl and hn.kd.pix, all records contained either the substring dynamic or adsl which indicates that the IP addresses originate from an ISP's address pool. All valid DNS PTR records ended with one of the following four domain names:
IP Address Spoofing In his analysis, Wilde [7] already tried to find evidence for a supposable IP address hijacking conducted by the GFC. The idea was that the GFC might not have its own dedicated address range-which would be trivial to block for Tor bridges and relays-but instead shortly hijacks otherwise assigned IP addresses for the sole purpose of scanning. However, Wilde's gathered traceroute data did not contain any indication for that hypothesis since the traceroute paths during and after scanning did not differ.
During manual tests we noticed that sometimes shortly after a scan, the respective IP address starts replying to ping requests 8 . In order to have more data to analyse, we wrote a script to automatically gather additional data as soon as a scanner connects and again some minutes afterwards. In particular, the script did the following:
-Run TCP, UDP and ICMP traceroutes immediately after a scan and again 15 minutes later. -Continuously ping the scanning IP address for 15 minutes.
-Capture all network traffic during these 15 minutes using tcpdump.
Between March 21 and 26 we started an independent round of attracting scanners and let our script gather the above mentioned additional data. We caused a total of 429 scans coming from 427 unique IP addresses. From all 429 scans we then extracted all connections where the continuous 15 minute ping resulted in at least one ping reply packet. This process yielded 85 connections which corresponds to approximately 20% of all observed connections.
We analysed the 85 connections by computing:
-The amount of minutes until a particular IP address started replying to our ping requests. -The IP TTL difference (new ttl -old ttl) between packets during the scan and ping replies.
The results are illustrated in Figure 2 (a) and 2(b). Figure 2 (a) depicts all IP TTL differences between after the scan (when the host starts replying to ping packets) and during the scan. We had 14 outliers with a TTL difference of 65 and 192 but did not list them in the histogram. It is clearly noticeable that the difference was mostly 1, meaning that after the scan, the TTL was 1 higher than during the scan. An example of a traceroute is given in Listing 1.5 and 1.6. We ran an ICMP traceroute to the IP address 60.208.176.112 during and 15 minutes after the scan. While the traceroute timed out during the scan, it finished successfully 15 minutes later. We point out that the traceroute during the scan timed out just one hop before the destination IP address.
One explanation for the changing TTL is that the GFC could be spoofing IP addresses. The GFC could be abusing several IP address pools intended for Internet users to allocate short-lived IP addresses for the purpose of scanning. We further speculate that sometimes the GFC might be spoofing IP addresses which are currently in use. When the spoofing ends, we are able to communicate with the "underlying" host which seems to be 1 hop behind the scanning machine. This could mean that the scanning infrastructure is located at data centers of ISPs. However, we stress that the GFC conducting IP spoofing is a mere hypothesis. There might be legitimate reasons for the observed TTL differences. From the GFC's point of view, spoofing ordinary client IP addresses would be effective since bridges and relays can not block the scanners at the IP layer. This would imply blocking legitimate Internet users from accessing the Tor network.
When Do the Scanners Connect?
In [7] , Wilde stated that all scanners connected within three minutes after multiples of 15 minutes, i.e., during the minute intervals [0, 3], [15, 18] , [30, 33] and [45, 48] . While these results were in accordance with our first manual tests during January, they did not hold true for our scanner attraction experiments after January. Figure 3 visualises when scanners connect. The y-axis depicts the minutes of the respective hour. Contrary to December 2011, when Wilde ran his experiments, the scanners now seem to use a broader time interval to launch the scans. In addition, the data contains two time intervals which are free from scanning. These intervals lasted from March 8 at around 17:30 to March 9 at 10:00 and from March 14 at 10:30 to March 16 at 4:30. We have no explanation why the GFC did not conduct scanning during that time.
Closer manual analysis yielded that the data exhibits a diurnal pattern. In order to make the pattern visible, we processed the data as four distinct time series with every 15 minute interval forming one time series, respectively. We smoothed the data points in the time series using simple exponential smoothing as defined in Equation 1. The algorithm takes our data points x as input and produces the smoothed time seriesx.
We experimented with various smoothing factors 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and found 0.05 to satisfyingly illustrate the diurnal pattern. The result-a subset of the data ranging from March 16 to March 23-is shown in Figure 4 . Each of the four diagrams represents one of the 15 minute intervals. The diagrams show that depending on the time of the day, on average, scanners connect either close to the respective 15 minute multiple or a little bit later.
We conjecture that the GFC maintains scanning queues. When the DPI boxes discover a potential Tor connection, the IP:port tuple of the suspected bridge is added to a queue. Every 15 minutes, these queues are processed and all IP:port tuples in the queue are being scanned. In the evening, more Chinese users try to access the Tor network than during the night. We assume that due to this additional load, it takes a longer time for the GFC to process the queues.
Blocking Malfunction
During our experiments we noticed a sudden disappearence of active scanning and blocking. This lack of scanning made it possible for us to successfully initiate Tor connections without causing bridges to get scanned and blocked. A similar downtime was observed by Wilde [23] . The downtime started at around January 25 and lasted until January 28. During these approximately three days many Chinese users were able to use the Tor network as can be seen in Figure 5 . The diagram shows a clear increase in usage followed by a drop to the same level as before. After three days the blocking infrastructure was operating as before and Tor connections from inside China were subject to the same active scanning as before the downtime.
We have no explanation for this downtime but it is worth pointing out that the downtime happened during the Chinese new year celebration which lasted from January 23 to January 29. During this time span the overall Internet usage in China decreased visibly as illustrated by Google's Transparency Report [24] . This correlation could indicate that the downtime was not an accident but rather a planned maintenance window.
Evasion
The above sections explored the infrastructure and blocking mechanisms adopted by China to block access to the Tor network. The question, which remains to be answered, is how to circumvent the blocking. This section discusses different evasion techniques which greatly differ in their concept but share the ultimate goal of circumventing the Chinese block. 
Obfsproxy
The Tor Project is developing a tool called obfsproxy [25] . The tool runs independently of Tor and is obfuscating the network traffic it receives from the Tor process. An example is shown in Figure 6 . In the figure, two obfsproxy instances-a client and a server-are exchanging obfuscated Tor traffic. Due to the obfuscation, the chinese DPI boxes are not able to identify the TLS cipher list anymore. As a result, the identification of Tor traffic will be much harder for DPI boxes.
Obfsproxy implements so called pluggable transport meaning that the precise way of obfuscation is determined by pluggable transport modules. As a result, one could implement a transport module for HTTP whose purpose is to make Tor traffic look like HTTP. In [26] , Moghaddam et al. describe the development of a pluggable transport module which mimics Skype traffic.
As of March 24, the official obfsproxy bundle [25] contained a list of 13 hardcoded obfsproxy bridges in its configuration file. From our VPS we tested the reachability of all of these bridges by trying to connect to them via telnet. We found that not a single connection succeeded. One bridge seemed to be offline and the connection to the remaining 12 bridges was aborted by spoofed RST segments.
The above result raises the question whether the GFC is able to block all obfsproxy connections or just the 13 hard-coded bridges. To answer this question, we set up a private obfsproxy bridge in Sweden and connected to it from within China. We initiated several connections to it over several hours and could always successfully establish a Tor circuit. We conclude that the IP:port tuples of the 13 hard-coded obfsproxy bridges were added to a blacklist to prevent widespread use of the official obfsproxy bundle. However, other obfsproxy bridges remain undetected by the GFC.
Blacklisting the Blacklisters
Chinese active scanners are almost indistinguishable from legitimate users. The scans originate from seemingly random IP addresses and may even use the official Tor client to connect to suspected bridges. Still, the scanners exhibit certain characteristics which make it possible to distinguish between legitimate users and scanners. Figure 3 indicates that scanners tend to connect at the beginning of every multiple of 15 minutes. A bridge can exploit this knowledge by simply acting "deaf" against all new connections from China for a while after a 15 minute interval has begun. Incoming TCP SYNs must be silently dropped so that scanners are not able to connect.
Deaf Time Window
Unfortunately, this strategy inevitably involves many false positives and leads to legitimate users not being able to connect to the bridge.
TCP SYN Retransmissions
In December 2011, Pietrosanti [27] observed that Chinese scanners retransmit only one TCP SYN segment if the first segment is lost. This behaviour differs from modern Windows and Linux machines which make use of more retransmissions. This phenomena can be equally exploited by instructing bridges to deliberately ignore the first two TCP SYNs.
We implemented the above two blacklisting strategies in a software tool called "brdgrd". The implementation offers the possibility to only accept the nth received SYN segment for a given IP:port tuple. During our experiments with open SOCKS proxies we noticed that this technique is able to shield off most scanners, but not all of them. We observed a few false positives which would result in a bridge being blocked.
While the SYN retransmission technique is able to prevent a large fraction of scanners from connecting, it causes collateral damage too since legitimate users can find themselves unable to connect. This is particularly true if there is lots of packet loss between a user and a bridge. Such a situation can effectively render a bridge unreachable for a user.
Packet Fragmentation
After all, the GFC is by its nature a distributed network intrusion detection system (NIDS). To evade it, one can look through the glasses of an attacker and consider strategies outlined in a 14 year old paper written by Ptacek and Newsham [28] .
One evasion technique described in the paper is packet fragmentation which exploits the fact that many NIDSes do not conduct packet reassembly. We used the tool fragroute [29] to enforce packet fragmentation on our machine in China. The tool allows the interception, modification and rewriting of outgoing network traffic and implements most of the attacks proposed in [28] .
We configured fragroute to split the TCP byte stream to segments of 16 bytes each. At minimum this configuration divides the 58 byte TLS cipher list into 4 TCP segments. In our test it took 5 TCP segments to transmit the fragmented cipher list to our bridge as can be seen in Listing 1.4.
Packet n +0: c0 0 a Packet n +1: c0 14 00 39 00 38 c0 0 f c0 05 00 35 c0 07 c0 09 Packet n +2: c0 11 c0 13 00 33 00 32 c0 0 c c0 0 e c0 02 c0 04 Packet n +3: 00 04 00 05 00 2 f c0 08 c0 12 00 16 00 13 c0 0 d Packet n +4: c0 03 fe ff 00 0 a 00 ff Listing 1.4. Fragmentation of the cipher list.
Despite awaiting several multiples of 15 minutes and initiating several fragmented Tor connections, we never noticed any active scanning of our bridge. This experiment indicates that the GFC does not conduct packet reassembly. A similar observation was made by Park and Crandall [30] .
We conclude that packet fragmentation on the client side is sufficient to evade detection by the DPI boxes. Still, this is an unpractical solution given that this method must be supported by all connecting Chinese users. A single user which does not use it triggers active scanning which then leads to the block of all bridges, that the user is connecting to. Another disadvantage is the significant protocol overhead due to the small TCP segments which leads to a decrease in throughput.
Due to the problems associated with client side fragmentation, we implemented a way of server side fragmentation in brdgrd. We extended the tool to rewrite the TCP window size announced by the bridge to the client inside the SYN/ACK segment. Due to the rewritten and small window size, the client does not transmit the complete TLS cipher list inside one segment but rather splits it across two or more segments. In our tests we could successfully establish Tor connections from within China without causing scanning. It must be noted that the rewriting is done without the bridge knowing and is an abuse of the TCP protocol.
Bridge Authorisation
Scanners can be locked out if bridges are extended to provide a way of authorisation. Such a scheme is developed by Smits et al. [31] . The authors propose to use a single packet authorisation mechanism. That way, a bridge can authorise a user and does not reveal its online status before the authorisation was successful. For an unauthorised user, such as a scanner, a bridge would appear to be offline.
Conclusions
China goes to great lengths to prevent its citizens from accessing the free Internet including the Tor anonymity network. We showed how access to Tor is being denied and we conjectured how the blocking and filtering infrastructure is designed. In addition, we discussed and proposed countermeasures intended to "unblock" the Tor network.
Our findings include that the Great Firewall of China might spoof IP addresses for the purpose of scanning Tor bridges and that domestic as well as ingress traffic does not seem to be subject to Tor fingerprinting. We also showed that the firewall is easily circumvented by packet fragmentation.
Tor fingerprinting and active scanning is effective for the firewall because Tor traffic is currently distinguishable from what is regarded as harmless traffic in China. Since Tor is being used more and more as censorship circumvention tool, it is crucial that this distinguishability is minimised.
